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$Unique_ID{USH01470} $Pretitle{128} $Title{The Amphibians Came to Conquer: Volume 2 Chapter 19B Flintlock - With What} $Subtitle{} $Author{Dyer, VAdm. George C.} $Affiliation{USN} $Subject{japanese kwajalein islands atoll air island day admiral marshalls january} $Volume{Vol. 2} $Date{1973} $Log{Table 4*0147001.tab } Book: The Amphibians Came to Conquer: Volume 2 Author: Dyer, VAdm. George C. Affiliation: USN Volume: Vol. 2 Date: 1973 Chapter 19B Flintlock - With What As early as August 1943, the 7th Infantry Division which had participated in the Kiska campaign in the Aleutian Islands had been designated by the Joint Chiefs for the Marshall Island campaign. By December 1943, the troops were in Hawaii. In early September 1943, the Fourth Marine Division, training on the Pacific Coast, was also designated for the Marshalls and their amphibious training on the West Coast expedited. The 22nd Marine Regiment then in Samoa, and the 106th Infantry Regiment in Hawaii, were soon added. By and large, all the naval ship resources which had been assigned to Galvanic were made available for Flintlock, with however the important stipulation that much of the Fifth Fleet, less the amphibians, must be sent to the South and Southwest Pacific immediately after the landings to assist Commander Third Fleet and General MacArthur in carrying out JCS approved operations against Kavieng in New Ireland and Manus Island in the Admiralty Islands. Task Organization - Flintlock The task organization established for Flintlock was similar to that which had been successful in the Gilberts. Vice Admiral Spruance, however, carried the title Commander Fifth Fleet rather than Commander Central Pacific Force. He commanded TF 50 and Rear Admiral Turner TF 51. The Japanese Defensive Strategy - The Marshalls In mid-September 1943, the Japanese high command, without letting Admiral Nimitz in on the secret, modified their "Z" Operation Plan and drew anew an outer boundary line around what they considered their "vital defensive area." The new line encompassed only the Kuriles, the Marianas, and the Carolines in the Central Pacific. The Gilbert Islands and the Marshall Islands, by this decision, were removed from the list of areas, where the Japanese Navy would commit their Combined Fleet, the heart of their seagoing Navy, to offensive battle. Had Vice Admiral Spruance known of this major Japanese decision, it is probable that he would have been much more worry-free as he moved into the Gilberts and into the Marshalls in November 1943, and in January 1944. This strategic withdrawal was a major defensive decision by the Japanese high command. But it was accompanied by a somewhat contrariwise Japanese decision to build up their garrisons and island defenses in the Marshalls and to feed into the Marshalls more of the scanty Japanese air resources. The purpose of this increased defensive effort was to gain adequate time to make the defenses of the Marianas and the Bonin Islands "impregnable." In accordance with these decisions, Japanese garrisons in the Marshalls, made up of both Army and Navy personnel, had reached the following combatant strength in December 1943, according to Japanese records. Jaluit 2,205 Mille 5,101 Maloelap 3,298 Wotje 3,097 The Japanese Naval personnel, trained along the lines of our Marines, were organized into "Special Naval Landing Forces" for duty on these island bases. The Japanese Army troops defending alongside these SNLFs were organized into Amphibious Brigades and "South Seas Detachments." The Defending Japanese The same Japanese Fourth Fleet, which had been responsible, with such limited seagoing resources, for defense of the Gilbert Islands, also was responsible for defending the Marshall Islands. The backbone of this very small Fleet was three light cruisers, the Isiszis, Naka, and Nagara, launched down the ways from 19 to 24 years prior to 1944. There was also a division of destroyers and some logistic support ships. The 24th Air Flotilla consisting of 40 bombers and 30 fighters, which replaced the 22nd Air Flotilla on 5 December 1943, provided a limited complement for the many air bases within the Marshall Island command. Vice Admiral Masashi Kobayashi, IJN, was the Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet, and long carried his heavy burden at a headquarters located on Truk in the Carolines. Rear Admiral Michiyuki Yamada, IJN, commanded the 24th Air Flotilla from his air headquarters on Namur Island. A subordinate unit of the Fourth Fleet, the Japanese 6th Base Force, and its immediate subordinate unit, the 6th Defenses Force, carried out the "defend and die" mission for the Marshalls in January-February 1944. Rear Admiral Monzo Akiyama, IJN, was in command of the 6th Base Force with headquarters on Kwajalein Island. On 19 November 1943, Vice Admiral Kobayashi, probably alerted by the air sighting of the LST's headed for the Gilberts, temporarily joined his subordinates at Kwajalein Atoll. However, he wisely returned to Truk before 31 January 1944. This visit to Kwajalein did not necessarily mean that the Japanese expected us to assault there. In fact, quite the contrary seems true. One Japanese naval officer on the Staff of the Combined Fleet in 1943-1944 gave, in 1945, his remembrance of the December 1943-January 1944 period of the Pacific War: There was divided opinion as to whether you would land at Jaluit or Mille. Some thought you would land on Wotje but there were few who thought you would go right to the heart of the Marshalls and take Kwajalein. There were so many possible points of invasion in the Marshalls, that we could not consider any one a strong point and consequently dispersed our strength. Mille, closest to the Gilberts, drew the largest troop strength. Defensive Strength - Kwajalein Atoll The Japanese defenses of the three main islands in Kwajalein Atoll, Kwajalein, Roi and Namur, were largely at the beaches. There was no defense in depth. A captured Japanese statement of doctrine of this period called for the "enemy to be destroyed at the beach," and should that fail, "then the enemy will be destroyed by counter-attack." This was the same Japanese scheme of defense as used at Tarawa. Since, as far as is known, no Japanese defender at Tarawa escaped homeward to advise his superiors on the proper future defense of atolls, the lagoon beaches of Kwajalein, Roi, and Namur Islands continued to be less well defended than the beaches fronting on the ocean. The JICPOA (Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area) post battle report of the defenses of Roi-Namur states: In studying the defenses of Roi-Namur it must be borne in mind that they presented nothing comparable to Tarawa, either as to size and number of weapons or construction and concentration of positions. There was nothing as large as the . . . 8" and the . . . 5.5" coast defense guns found on Tarawa. There were no positions for the 8cm [3.2"] coast defense and 5cm [3.2"], the 75mm [3"] mobile antiaircraft, 75mm [3"] mountain gun, or the 70mm [2.8"] infantry howitzer as were found on Tarawa; nor were any guns of the anti-boat, anti-personnel group found except for two 37mm [1.5"] rapid fire guns. Following a count of the fixed guns positions made by JICPOA and by the Engineer of the V Amphibious Corps, after the successful assault, their judgment was that, compared with Tarawa, the ocean beach defenses of Kwajalein Island were good but not strong. The defenses of Roi-Namur were judged very modest on the lagoon beaches, good but not strong on the ocean beach approaches, and superior to those of Kwajalein. As the Engineer, V Amphibious Corps; stated in his Flintlock Report on 15 February 1944: While Roi-Namur were better fortified than Kwajalein, the siting of weapons was premised on an attempted landing from the north and seaward side. When Flintlock was all over, the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, gave as its opinion: The effective aerial bombing, naval shelling and artillery concentration placed on the defended islands of Kwajalein Atoll, made an accurate study of the Japanese defenses impossible. But despite this assertion, JICPOA did make diagrams of the defenses, based on captured Japanese drawings of the defense installations, interrogation of prisoners, and on ground reconnaissance conducted 2 February 1944. These diagrams were used for the Army's history of the seizure of the Marshalls. The diagrams of Japanese defenses shown in the Marine monograph of the Marshalls operation, published in 1954, very markedly increase the Japanese defenses on the lagoon areas (where the Marines landed) over those recorded by JICPOA or by the Engineer on Major General Holland Smith's Fifth Amphibious Corps Staff. To illustrate, on the lagoon beaches of Roi, the diagrams for the Marine monograph show four large concrete Japanese blockhouses similar to the blockhouses on the north and west shores of Roi designated "Brownie," "Bobby," "Bernie," and "Bruce." They correspond exactly to a situation map prepared on 24 December 1943 by the Intelligence Section, Fifth Amphibious Force, from photo interpretations. A later Marine situation map, issued by the Fifth Amphibious Corps on 31 December 1943, after more photographic reconnaissance, and distributed three weeks before the Marines left Hawaii, shows but two of these blockhouses on the lagoon beaches of Roi. Before the assault, the Maryland polished off "Bruce" as the accompanying photograph will show. Following the battle, JICPOA and the Engineer for the Marines Fifth Amphibious Corps, after tramping over Roi-Namur early in February 1944, reported fewer defensive positions than the 24 December situation map. In further substantiation, the text of the Marine monograph reads in regard to this particular point of large blockhouses in the lagoon shore of Roi: In place of the two blockhouses reported by aerial photographic interpreters, the Marines found but one stove-in pillbox, surrounded by a profusion of fuel drums and jetsam from what had evidently been a dump area. This was "Bruce." Japanese Defenders Post-war interrogation of Japanese officers indicated that on 23 December 1943, 1,500 troops reached Mille from Kwajalein In an intelligence estimate written about the time this movement was happening, Rear Admiral Turner's guess as to Japanese strength on Kwajalein Atoll was: It is estimated that . . . approximately 7500 [Japanese] troops are located on Kwajalein Atoll including 3000 base and construction Personnel. It is considered likely that the total number is fairly evenly distributed between the Northern and Southern Islands. This was a very good over all estimate of Japanese military Personnel and attached labor units but considerably overestimated the number of Japanese troops. Post-war study of the scanty Japanese records available led to an estimate in 1954 by Army historians of total Japanese strength of about 7,500, of whom 5,000 were base or construction Personnel or Korean laborers. The same year, the Marine historians estimated a total of 8,000 Japanese military Personnel and attached labor units with 3,000 on Roi-Namur, 3,000 on Kwajalein, and 2,000 on other islands within the atoll. It seems well established that on all of Kwajalein Atoll, the total of Japanese Special Naval Landing Force Personnel, trained in the same manner as our Marines, and Japanese infantrymen did not exceed 2,500 the large majority of whom were on Kwajalein. It has been established that there were about 1,820 effective Japanese Army and Navy infantry type troops on Kwajalein, plus about half as many staff and communication personnel, and some 1,800 other para-military, including 1,400 labor troops and a contingent of Koreans. Of these 1,820 effectives, 729 were Japanese Army troops who had the bad luck to be on Kwajalein Island awaiting transportation to Wotje when our forces assaulted Kwajalein Additionally, there were 550 regularly assigned Army troops, and 250 Japanese-type Marines from the Yokosuka 4th Special Naval Landing Force. Fourteen hundred labor troops unfit for ordinary military service were building the new airfield on Kwajalein. As in Vietnam nowadays, the Marines on Roi-Namur and the other northern islands were exact in counting the bodies. They reported counting 3,563 enemy dead or captured in the northern half of Kwajalein Atoll. In any case, the bulk of the regularly assigned Japanese (some 2,500) on the two causeway-connected islands, Roi and Namur, were technical aviation or aviation base personnel such as storekeepers and aviation machinists as there were only 345 Japanese troops assigned there from the defending 61st Guard Force. Japanese records and post-battle interrogation of prisoners indicate there were 357 laborers supporting the Japanese construction and base personnel on Roi-Namur. The How: The General Plan for Flintlock Vice Admiral Spruance, Commander Central Pacific Force, issued his Operation Plan for Flintlock, CEN-1-44, on 6 January 1944. He designated Rear Admiral Turner as Commander Task Force 51 and Commander Joint Expeditionary Force. Rear Admiral Richard L. Conolly, who had distinguished himself in the Mediterranean during the Tunisian, Sicilian, and Italian amphibious campaigns, and who had been specifically requested by CINCPAC for amphibious assignment in the Pacific, was charged with the capture of the northern half of Kwajalein Atoll as Commander Task Force 53. The Fourth Division of Marines, under Major General Harry Schmidt, USMC, was the Northern Landing Force. Rear Admiral Turner as CTF 52 and Commander Southern Attack Force, together with Major General C. H. Corlett, USA, as Commander Southern Landing Force and the Army's Seventh Infantry Division were charged with taking the southern half of Kwajalein Atoll. Captain Donald W. Loomis, who had fought through Watchtower and Galvanic, was assigned as Commander Attack Force Reserve Group (CTG 51.1). Carried aboard the ships of his command were about 9,000 troops from the 22nd Regiment of Marines and the 106th Infantry Regiment, under Brigadier General Thomas E. Watson, USMC, and designated as the Reserve Landing Force. Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill, the third of the regularly assigned amphibious group commanders in the Fifth Amphibious Force, was CTG 51.2 and charged with the occupation of Majuro Atoll. Lieutenant Colonel Frederick B. Sheldon, USA, commanded the Majuro Landing Force, which was the 2nd Battalion of the 106th Infantry Regiment. Code Names The geographical names of the smaller islands in the Kwajalein Atoll, in general, were such difficult tongue twisters that, not only before the assault, but subsequent thereto, it was customary to use their code names in lieu of their regular ones. This practice is continued in this work. Here are the principal islands and their code names: [See Table 4: Code Names of Kwajalein Islands] Strategic Features The principal strategic features of the CINCPOA Flintlock Plan called for: a. Intensified bombing of the Marshalls commencing 15 January 1944 by shore-based air and by carrier-based air. b. Intensified submarine attacks on all Japanese naval and merchant shipping in the Marshalls. c. Heavy gun bombardment of selected Japanese naval and air bases in the Marshalls commencing on 29 January 1944 by new battleships temporarily detached from fast carrier task groups, and by a special bombardment group of heavy cruisers and destroyers. The Schemes of Maneuver - Basic Plan The basic overall Flintlock plan envisioned that the neutralization of Wotje and Maloelap by bombing from land-based air, by carrier air attacks, and by surface gun bombardment would be accomplished by 30 January 1944. The Northern and Southern islands of Kwajalein Atoll were to be assaulted simultaneously by the amphibians on 31 January 1944. Majuro - which was believed to be either very lightly held or perhaps undefended - was to be "seized by one Marine defense battalion." Majuro was to be kept from being alerted to an impending assault by not being attacked in any way prior to Dog Day. The general Schemes of Maneuver at Kwajalein Atoll and at Majuro Atoll contemplated three phases. This phased and hence slower approach to the main objective was one which had been considered during the planning period for the Gilbert Islands Operation. It was rejected by Admiral Spruance because of anticipation of an immediate response to the assault by main Japanese Fleet and air forces, and hence the need for surprise and quick conquest. The three phases were: Phase I Seizure of island positions from which to support main landings. Dog Day Phase II Assault and occupy Roi and Namur Islands in the north and Dog Day Kwajalein Island in the south of Kwajalein Atoll, and Darrit Plus One Island in Majuro Atoll. Phase III Establish defenses on assault islands and reduce enemy opposition Dog Day on remaining islands of Kwajalein Atoll and Majuro Atoll. Plus ??? Phase I - Kwajalein The Scheme of Maneuver for Kwajalein Island developed by Commander Landing Troops for the Southern Attack Force, and declared hydrographically practical by the Navy, called for troops to land before dawn on Dog Day from two APDs on two small islands guarding a good entrance channel (Gea Pass) to Kwajalein Lagoon some nine miles to the northwest of Kwajalein. These two islands were named Ninni and Gea and bore the code names of CECIL and CARTER. At How Hour on Dog Day, initially set for 0830, 31 January 1944, other troops would land on Ennylabegan Island and Enubuj Islands (code names Carlos and Carlson). On Carlson Island, which was only two and a half miles from Kwajalein, artillery would be emplaced for support of the main assault of the Southern Landing Force. These four landings were Phase I of the Scheme of Maneuver for the Southern Attack Force. Phase II - Kwajalein Depending upon the success of these operations on Dog Day, the main assault landings would take place on the western beaches of Kwajalein Island at William Hour, 0930, the following day. This main assault was Phase II of the Southern Attack Force operation. From the seaman's point of view, the western beaches of Kwajalein Island were well chosen since they did provide some lee from the prevailing swell for amtracs carrying their important loads of assault troops. Landing seasick soldiers on a defended shore is one sure way to get an assault started under a handicap. A landing effected on the western beaches of Kwajalein Island would be free from flanking fire, and the beachhead established there could be supported by both naval and shore based artillery. The latter aspect necessitated a landing on the small island, Carlson, to the northwestward. The alternate Scheme of Maneuver called for Phase II landings on lagoon beaches Green Two, Green Three and Green Four, along the northwestern shore of Kwajalein Island. Phase I - Roi-Namur The Scheme of Maneuver at Roi-Namur followed the classic pattern of seizing lightly defended islands within artillery range of the main objective, in order to provide artillery support, in addition to naval gunfire for the main assault landings. Since the assault landings were to be made from the lagoons it was equally necessary that these islands be under our control to prevent their use by the enemy to fire on and disrupt the assault craft as they approached the assault beaches. In this case, Ivan (Mellu) and Jacob (Ennuebing) Islands, south and west of Roi Island, were to be captured by landings from seaward at How Hour on Dog Day - hopefully set at 0900, 31 January. Ninety minutes later Allen (Ennubirr) and Albert (Ennumennet) Islands eastward across the lagoon and southeast of Namur Island were to be seized by landings on their lagoon beaches. These four landings, followed by the Marines on Albert (Ennumennet) moving north to Abraham (Ennugarret) Island for a fifth landing, were Phase I. Successful accomplishment would permit a considerable amount of artillery to be landed on Dog Day for support of the main assaults on Dog Day plus one. /3 Phase II - Roi-Namur Scheduled for 1 February 1944, were simultaneous landings on the southern (lagoon) beaches of Roi Island and Namur Island at Red Two, Red Three and Green One, Green Two Beaches respectively. This was Phase II. This Scheme of Maneuver at Roi-Namur was more complicated than it may seem since it involved five objectives to be taken on one day by a provisional Landing Group of Marines, with a limited number of amtracs (10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion). The timing, with the available supply of amtracs, was exact and depended for efficient execution upon reliable voice radio communications, both afloat and ashore. Majuro The Scheme of Maneuver for Majuro was not greatly different in concept from the standard pattern. It called for seizure on Dog Day of two small islands, Eroj and Calalin, marking Calalin Channel, the main entrance to Majuro Lagoon, followed by a "shore-to-shore" amphibious movement to seize the larger islands on Dog Day and Dog plus one. The necessary troops were carried aboard one attack transport and one destroyer-type transport. Since there was but one Japanese soldier on Majuro to "defend and die," this operation can be told in one paragraph. The first report from the reconnaissance party landed to take a "look-see" and get the up-to-the-minute information on Japanese forces, and made about 2345 on 30 January 1944, was that 300 to 400 Japanese troops were on Darrit Island. Contrary information was soon at hand that there were only four Japanese, only one of whom was military, on the islands of Majuro Atoll. But before this second and correct report was at hand, Darrit Island was under gun bombardment from Rear Admiral Hill's task group. It took some minutes to grind the fire to a halt, and some hours to complete a physical reconnaissance of all the islands and capture the single Japanese naval warrant officer, who was the custodian and overseer of Japanese property in Majuro Atoll, and the sole military occupant. It was not until 15 February 1944 that radio silence was broken at Majuro Atoll. By that time Majuro was an operating Fleet anchorage, and soon to be a primary staging base for operations against the Marianas. Northern and Southern Attack Forces The capture of the small islands guarding the main ship entrances into Kwajalein lagoon and the early sweeping of these channels and anchorage areas within the lagoon were essential features of the plans from a naval as well as a troop point of view. Both unloading of logistic support and close fire support would be facilitated by the calmer waters of the lagoon. Following these mine sweeping operations, fire support ships and transports would enter the lagoons. Time Out For New Year Cheer The New Year found All Hands in the Fifth Amphibious Force pressing for the rehearsals for Flintlock soon to be held. Not too busy, however, for the LST-242 started her 1944 War Diary with this bad doggerel: Ensign Spoenernan O.O.D. In Drydock's 2 sheltered lee Upon blocks as before Making ready for Pacific War. Of three other ships we're aware in here also for repair The other vessels are LST Twenty-three and Two forty-three. The Eighty-four is with us too Pearl Harbor makes us all like new Yard work continues on apace In this busy naval base. Pre-Dog Day, Army Air Force Air Strikes Anyone who had questioned the necessity of taking the Gilberts before moving into the Marshalls, should have had his doubts removed - when the Army Air Force moved its Seventh Air Force bombers and fighters from Oahu, Funafuti, Nanomea, Baker, and Canton into the Gilberts, and put them to work under Rear Admiral J. H. Hoover, Commander Defense Forces and Land/Base Air, CTF 57. Altogether TF 57 had nearly 350 Army and Navy aircraft. The B-24s based back in the Ellice Islands were flying 2,794, 3,027 or 3,100 miles to reach their Marshall Island targets and were able to mount a strike only about every other day. In the last ten days of November 1943, they mounted strikes against Jaluit, Mille, Maloelap, the former once and the latter two atolls twice. They mustered a total of 59 B-24s over the targets in these five strikes of late November 1943. In the last ten days of December 1943, when the Ellice Island aircraft could stage through Tarawa going or returning and the shorter range A-25s and B-25s could be based on Tarawa, the Seventh Air Force mustered 210 bombers over not only Jaluit, Mille and Maloelap, but over far away Wotje and Kwajalein. And the chores of the bombers were made considerably less risky by the fact that P-39's and, later, P-40 fighter aircraft were able to accompany them to the nearer targets and help fend off the Japanese fighter aircraft. By the last ten days of January 1944, the period just before the invasion of the Marshalls, with the newly built airfield on Apamama in the Gilbert Islands now available for use, the number of bomber strikes by Task Force 57 again more than doubled rising to 444. Any fortified Japanese atoll in the Marshalls that was not struck every day was in good luck. Additionally, the Marshall Atolls near the Gilberts were strafed daily by fighters or had United States fighter patrols maintained over them during daylight hours to prevent their use by Japanese aircraft. Thus, the capture of the Gilberts paid tremendous dividends. Pre-Dog Day Naval Air Strikes Way back in October 1943, and well before the Galvanic armada had sailed from Pearl Harbor in November for the Gilberts, Admiral Nimitz noted in his Command Summary: The planning groups currently are preparing studies and outline plans for carrier raids on the Marshall Islands and Nauru immediately after completion of Galvanic, and on Truk sometime between Galvanic and Flintlock. A reorganized and considerably reduced in size Task Force 50 (Rear Admiral Pownall) with four large carriers, Enterprise, Essex, Lexington and Yorktown, two cruiser-hulled carriers, Belleau Wood (CVL.24), and Cowpens (CVL.25), with supporting combatant ships and 386 aircraft, was ordered to make raids on Kwajalein and Wotje on its way home to Pearl from Galvanic. The Task Force approach was made from the northeast of Kwajalein with initial launch for the 4 December attack near Rongerik Atoll. Numerous photographic missions were flown, and 246 aircraft participated in the operation. Japanese air reaction was heavy and sustained. Bombing success was modest, although 85.5 tons of bombs were dropped on Kwajalein Atoll and 11.0 tons on Wotje Atoll. Taroa Island in Maloelap Atoll was not hit at all and a second planned strike on the other objectives was not carried through. The Lexington picked up a torpedo in her stern quarter during a night Japanese torpedo attack, pushed through while the task group was hightailing it for Pearl Harbor. However, one of the photographic planes brought home a clear picture of a new bomber strip on Kwajalein Island, which was about 70 percent completed. This meant that the amphibians probably would have to assault simultaneously both Roi-Namur in the northern part of the atoll and Kwajalein Island in the southern part. And it represented one more reason indicating the desirability of an early seizure of Kwajalein Atoll. On the original of the CTF 50 report of this operation and opposite the recommendations for future air strikes at the Marshalls as made by Rear Admiral Pownall to Admiral Nimitz appears a pencil notation "all defensive" in recognizable handwriting. In any case when the attack carrier task forces went to sea as TF 58 for Flintlock, Rear Admiral Marc A. Mitscher was the Task Force Commander and Vice Admiral J. H. Towers, the long-time naval aviator, was the Deputy to CINCPAC, Rear Admiral Pownall having relieved the latter as Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet. Between 27 and 30 January 1944, the fast carrier task forces, Task Force 58, divided into four groups and carrying nearly 700 aircraft, not only worked over Roi and Kwajalein Islands, but finished off Japanese air strength on Wotje and Maloelap Atolls and started Eniwetok Atoll on the downhill path. Composite Efforts Task Force 57 and Task Force 58 The composite and heavy pre-Dog Day air strikes of the naval carrier air and naval land based planes and the Army Air Force land based planes wiped out the Japanese defensive air resources in the eastern Marshalls during the month of January 1944. The few serviceable Japanese aircraft remaining as January drew to a close were evacuated from Jaluit, Mille, and Wotje before Dog Day, and all pilots from Maloelap on Dog Day plus one. The Japanese reported they lost 100 planes during this period. United States estimates were 50 percent higher. The end result was the same; zero Japanese aircraft remained. Japanese records do not disclose how many flyable planes were on Kwajalein Atoll on 29 January 1944, when the final fast carrier task force attacks began. One Japanese officer reported there were only 10 serviceable aircraft on Kwajalein Atoll by 25 January. On the other hand it has been guessed that there were as many as 35 flyable Japanese aircraft at the atoll on Dog Day minus one. In any case, no Japanese plane was aloft over Kwajalein Atoll after the morning carrier attack on 30 January. As an interested Army observer wrote to the Chief of Staff of the Army Air Force: The consistent bombing of the Japanese airfields in the Marshalls prior to Dog Day resulted in the fast carrier task forces approaching their objectives undetected. Not one hostile aircraft made an attack against any element of our naval forces in the Marshalls prior to, during or immediately after Dog Day. Neutralization Group A new naval element was brought into Flintlock, the Neutralization Group of three heavy cruisers, four destroyers and two minecraft. The Neutralization Group was given the mission to: Deny to the enemy the use of airfields at Wotje and Taroa [Maloelap] by maintaining an intermittent surface ship bombardment of the airfields, air facilities and housing areas. Mine the lagoon entrances. They were to commence operations on Dog Day minus two, and their operations had to be based on the assumption that so few Japanese aircraft would still be flying in the Marshalls that these ships could cruise unharmed by air attack within gun range of the Japanese airfields. This turned out to be a valid assumption as far as Japanese aircraft were concerned. The Neutralization Group conducted daylight cruiser bombardments of Taroa and Wotje on 29, 30, and 31 January from beyond the range of the shore batteries and continued these gunnery drills 0111, 2, and 3 February 1944. The destroyers conducted six-hour night bombardments of Taroa and Wotje on the nights of 29 and 30 January and 1 February. Some 2,352 eight-inch high capacity shells and 2,240 five-inch common shells were fired to keep the air strips inoperative and to destroy supporting Japanese installations. Fifty to sixty percent of the projectiles fired without point detonating fuses failed to explode. Despite this handicap and in combination with carrier air strikes on Taroa on 29 and 30 January and on Wotje on 29, 30, and 31 January, Japanese air efforts in the eastern Marshalls became a flat zero. Pre-Dog Day Gun Bombardment - Marshalls To supplement the efforts of the Neutralization Group, a special detachment of the Northern Support Group (TG 53.5) consisting of one heavy cruiser, three light cruisers and six destroyers, also bombarded Otdia Island in Wotje Atoll on 30 January. A brisk encounter between the still alert 5.5-inch coast defense guns and the 6-inch and 8-inch guns of the cruisers was ended when the ships opened the range after the destroyer Anderson had been hit. The ships continued with their primary mission, the bombardment of the runways and revetments. Some 6,620 shells were plowed into the airfield area. Gunfire Support The instructions of senior Fleet commanders for gunfire support to be fired at Kwajalein Atoll were a great deal more detailed than they had been in previous amphibious operations. The Commander in Chief, Pacific laid down certain general principles, which the lower commands were required to follow. With slight modifications this became the pattern for the remaining amphibious campaigns in the area of Pacific Fleet operations. Specifically, he directed: Bombardment 1. Naval Gunfire Support - Gunfire support plans for bombardment of enemy-held atoll islands should embody the following: a. Five general phases of bombardment as follows: (1) Initial counter-battery fire against known strong points using HC [high capacity] and AP [armor piercing] projectiles, and commencing at ranges producing an angle of fall of 15 degrees. (2) General area bombardment using HC and AA common projectiles delivered at ranges between 10,000 and 5,000 yards. (3) Destruction of heavy defenses, pillboxes, and dugouts along the landing beaches by slow, accurate, and deliberate fire, using AP and common projectiles. This fire is to be delivered at close ranges using pointer fire, if practicable. (4) Heavy concentration fire at close range on landing beach areas during the boat approach. (5) Delivery of call fire by ships assigned after H-Hour. a. Use of a rolling barrage system of fire rather than radical shifting of target areas during area bombardment. b. Restriction of air burst firing to use only as a weapon of opportunity against exposed personnel. c. Maximum use of 40mm batteries whenever range and other conditions permit and control of these batteries by 5-inch gun directors, if fire control installations permit. d. Stationing of close fire support ships in a favorable position relative to the landing beaches, and at closest safe navigation range, so as to provide their continuous observation of the assault boat waves, permitting these ships to decide at what time their fire must cease for safety of landing personnel.